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Oligopolistic Competition of Gencos in Reactive
Power Ancillary Service Provisions
Puneet Chitkara, Member, IEEE, Jin Zhong, Member, IEEE, and Kankar Bhattacharya, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—The need for a market based approach for reactive
power procurement has been recognized by FERC. Due to the
localized characteristic of reactive power, regulatory mechanisms
are necessary to mitigate the possibility of holding market power
by generators. The regulator is responsible for devising the regu-
latory mechanisms that provide incentives to generators to supply
reactive power while preventing the abuse of market power. This
paper proposes a mathematical model to simulate the strategic
behavior of generators supplying reactive power while considering
the system operator’s schedule. The proposed method can be used
by the regulator to simulate the market behavior in the reactive
power supply. We further study how regulatory policies affect the
strategic behavior. An alternative price cap method has been pro-
posed and tested in the numerical example to mitigate the effect
of strategic behavior of generators in reactive power procurement
by the system operator. The numerical examples are tested on the
Nordic 32-bus system.
Index Terms—Mathematical problem with complementarity
constraints, multi-leader-follower games, reactive power, strategic
offering, supply function equilibrium.
NOMENCLATURE:
Indices:
Index for buses.
Index for gencos owning generating units.
Set of all generators belonging to genco .
Total number of buses in the system.
Total number of gencos in the market.
Variables:
Active power generation from a generator owned
by genco at bus , p.u.
Reactive power generation from a generator owned
by genco at bus , p.u.
Voltage magnitude at bus , p.u.
Voltage angle at bus , radians.
Strategic variable of generator belonging to genco
at bus .
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Market clearing price of reactive power ($/p.u.
MVAr).
Dual of active power injection constraint.
Dual of reactive power injection constraint.
Dual of the minimum voltage limit constraint.
Dual of the maximum voltage limit constraint.
Dual of minimum reactive power generation
constraint.
Dual of maximum reactive power generation
constraint.
Dual of minimum active power generation constraint.
Dual of maximum active power generation
constraint.
Dual of market clearing price determination
constraint.
Vector of strategic variables of generators owned by
genco .
Vector of dual variables attached to the inequality
KKT conditions of ISO’s problem.
Vector of dual variables attached to the equality
KKT conditions of ISO’s problem.
Vector of dual variables attached to complementarity
KKT conditions of ISO’s problem.
Dual of maximum strategic variable constraint.
Dual of minimum strategic variable constraint.
Constants:
Intercept of generator’s cost
curve.
Slope of generator’s cost curve,
$/p.u. MVAr.
Minimum voltage limit at each
bus , p.u.
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Maximum voltage limit at each
bus , p.u.
Minimum reactive power
generation limit, p.u.
Maximum reactive power
generation limit, p.u.
Contract value of real power, p.u.
Variation allowed in contracted
real power, p.u.
Lower limit of real power
variation, p.u.
Upper limit of real power
variation, p.u.
Minimum value of strategic
variable.
Maximum value of strategic
variable.
Active power demand at bus ,
p.u.
Reactive power demand at bus ,
p.u.
Element of the conductance
matrix, p.u.
Element of the susceptance
matrix, p.u.
I. INTRODUCTION
R EACTIVE power has been recognized as one of the ancil-lary services to be provided by generators for the reliable
operation of the power system. It can also substantially improve
the efficiency of delivering active power to customers. Further-
more, sufficient reactive power injected at certain locations can
also alleviate transmission constraints and allow cheaper power
to be delivered to heavy loaded areas. Because of the nature
of reactive power supply, it needs to be procured and managed
locally in an efficient and reliable manner. It has been recom-
mended by FERC that generators providing reactive power be
paid on a nondiscriminatory basis [1].
It has been argued in [2]–[4] that two components of payment
be used for financial compensation to the generators providing
reactive power ancillary services, 1) a capacity payment which
is paid in advance for their readiness to produce/absorb reactive
power, and 2) a usage component which is paid for reactive
power actually dispatched in real-time. It is suggested in [2] that
reactive power can be procured through long-term contracts
between the independent system operator (ISO) and generators
in order to isolate the reactive power prices from the impact
of real-time market price volatilities. A competitive market
framework for reactive power is proposed in [5]–[7] wherein
a reactive power bidding structure is proposed and the reactive
power provided by generators is settled at a uniform market
price.
However, it is reported in [3], [6], and [7] that market power
can exist in reactive power markets and that some reactive power
suppliers can indeed manipulate reactive power market prices.
In [8], the reactive market power is measured using must-run
indices. It is noted in these studies that certain reactive power
suppliers hold market power because of the limited number of
supply-side providers at certain strategic buses coupled with the
fact that transportation of reactive power over long distances is
not a technically justifiable operating decision.
The market regulator is generally responsible for devising
regulatory mechanisms that strike a balance between providing
adequate incentives to generators to supply reactive power while
also overseeing and preventing their abuse of market power.
In order to investigate the strategic behavior of generators, a
reactive power procurement process and the strategic interac-
tions between the ISO and generation companies (gencos) as
well as amongst gencos is simulated in this paper.
In the literature on modeling strategic behavior in electricity
markets, alternative representations have been used to model the
conjectures of competing players. Hobbs [9] assumes Cournot
conjectures between gencos in active power markets where gen-
erators sell power to the grid at the locational marginal price
(LMP). Day et al. [10] use a conjectured supply function (CSF)
model to demonstrate strategic behavior in active power mar-
kets. Wang et al. [11] also use a CSF approach to model an equi-
librium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) to deter-
mine the equilibrium strategies of various generators. The CSF
model, as opposed to the Cournot model, allows the rivals to
alter their supplies in response to price changes. All the above
models use the dc load flow in their analysis.
Bautista et al. [12] analyze imperfect competition in active
power markets using ac load flow model. The consideration
of nonlinear ac load flow allows analysis of the impact of
strategic behavior on reactive power and voltage constraints.
The multi-leader-follower game presented in the paper has
been formulated as a nonlinear programming (NLP) problem
based on [13].
In this paper, a strategic bidding model considering ac load
flow is presented that simulates the behavior of generators par-
ticipating in reactive power procurement by the ISO. The game
is formulated as a multi-leader-follower game. The ISO is as-
sumed to be the follower, while the leaders are the gencos sup-
plying reactive power. The gencos are assumed to have conjec-
tures about the supply functions of their rivals; hence the solu-
tion represents the supply function equilibrium between gencos
(leaders).
The proposed model can be used to analyze the strategic be-
havior of gencos in the system. Based on the results, some reg-
ulatory mechanisms are proposed that can restrict the effects of
their strategic behavior. In the case studies, the effectiveness of
the proposed alternative price cap regulation in alleviating abuse
of market power is examined.
This paper is organized as follows: the mathematical model
is formulated in Section II. The solution method is discussed
in Section III. In Section IV, the model is tested on the Nordic
32-bus system. The results and discussions are presented.
Section V concludes with suggestions for the regulatory poli-
cies on reactive power procurement.
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II. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
In this paper, the strategic behavior of generators providing
for reactive power ancillary services is simulated with the as-
sumption that the energy market has already been settled and
that the active power from generators has already been sched-
uled. This assumption is in line with the reactive power manage-
ment scheme proposed in [2] and [6]. However, in order to en-
sure that a feasible optimal solution is obtained, the active power
production of each generator is allowed to vary within a narrow
range around the optimal dispatch . In the reactive
power optimization problem, the ISO minimizes the payment
for reactive power and obtains the optimal reactive power dis-
patch. The gencos are assumed to offer their supply functions
for reactive power strategically to maximize their profits. The
reactive power market price is assumed to be uniform for all
generators, and it is the offer price of the marginal generator
which is selected for supplying reactive power.
In this paper the game is formulated as a multi-leader-fol-
lower game that has multiple dominant players (leaders)—the
gencos and one follower—the ISO. Furthermore, the response
of the follower (ISO) is constrained to be identical for each
leader. In practical operation, the gencos are assumed to provide
different quantities of reactive power at different offer prices.
This means that the competition is more akin to supply function
competition. The supply function submitted by each genco for
each generator is , where is
the simplified linear marginal cost function of reactive power
generation of the generator located at bus and belonging
to genco . Parameters and are the intercept and slope of
the linear supply function of the generator belonging to genco
at node . In this paper, is the strategic offer variable of each
generator. The choice of strategic offer variable greater than
unity allows the generator to offer reactive power price greater
than the marginal cost. This variable is therefore an indicator of
the extent to which each genco can exercise market power by
charging a price greater that its marginal cost. Alternatively,
or could have been chosen as the strategic variables [14].
The game between multi-gencos and the ISO is formulated in
this paper as an EPEC. Such problems were introduced in [15]
and further developed in [16] in the context of modeling com-
petition in European electricity markets.
A. ISO’s Problem
Given each generator’s offer, the optimization problem faced
by the ISO is to determine the reactive power output of each
unit. The ISO minimizes the payment to be made to the genera-
tors for reactive power (1), subject to load flow (2)–(3), voltage
limits (4)–(5), reactive power generation limits (6)–(7) and the
constraint to ensure that the market price, for a given set of of-
fers, is the highest reactive power offer accepted (10). The offer
price of the genco is ; therefore, in (10) de-
termines the highest selected offer price from amongst all offers,
which becomes the uniform market price for reactive power and
is payable to all the gencos:
Maximize (1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
where the variables , , , , , , ,
, and are the duals of the respective constraints.
is the uniform market price for reactive power, which is the
highest price of all accepted offers.
and , where is the contracted real
power and is the small variation allowed from contracted
real power.
B. Genco’s Problem
The gencos are required to offer price-quantity pairs in the re-
active power auction. They are also aware that the reactive power
demand is generally inelastic and hence these players would like
to strategize their offers to maximize their profits from reactive
power supply. The gencos need to decide how much reactive
power and at what prices to supply in the market, since supply of
reactive power could cause generator winding losses, as well as
reduce/limit their cash flows from active power markets because
of operational requirements in the opportunity region [2]–[7].
Hence the price offered for reactive power by a genco would
be governed not only by the operation cost and opportunity
cost but also the inelasticity of the reactive power demand. The
genco’s profit maximization problem is thus stated below, with
the objective function denoting the profit of genco as
Maximize (12)
Subject to
(13)
(14)
1This is a reasonable assumption since no genco is likely to supply at a price
lower than its marginal cost.
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Equation (13) sets a lower bound on the strategic offer vari-
able , and (14) sets an upper bound on it . For the purpose
of analysis in this paper, it is assumed that the gencos do not
bid below their marginal costs and hence the lower bound,
is equal to unity for all gencos. 1 The upper bound can
be set by the gencos based on their experience in the market or
based on the price cap set for reactive power procurement by the
regulator.
While maximizing its profit, the genco takes into account the
equilibrium conditions of the ISO (the follower). Hence, the
Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions of the ISO’s problem
are incorporated as constraints in the genco’s problem. This
will be a mathematical problem with equilibrium constraints
(MPEC) for each genco. The extent to which a genco increases
its offer price above its marginal cost is denoted by , which is
a dimensionless quantity. Based on the past observation of the
rival gencos in the market, each genco is also assumed to have an
idea about the range in which the rival gencos can vary their .
III. SOLUTION METHOD
A. Derivation of ISO’s Optimality Conditions
The KKT conditions (given in Appendix A) are necessary
for the optimality of the ISO’s optimization problem. Since the
ISO’s problem is not convex, the solution to the KKT conditions
may lead to a saddle point or a local maximum. As pointed out in
[15] and [16], this difficulty is inherent to nonconvex problems.
It is suggested that a practical way to partially overcome this
problem is to test different starting points.
Let denote the vector of all decision variables and Lagrange
multipliers of the ISO’s problem, i.e.,
where and
.
It may be noted that is a vector of free variables or
variables within a predefined finite range, whereas is a
vector of all variables constrained to be nonnegative. The
KKT conditions of the ISO’s optimization are parameterized
in , where is the total number of
gencos, and denote the offer strategy
of the generating company . This is because the ISO has
no control over the offer strategies of the gencos. The vector
is used to represent all
the equality KKT conditions of the ISO’s problem given
by (A1), (A2), (A3), (A4), (A7), and (A8) in Appendix A,
and to represent all the
inequality KKT conditions of the ISO’s problem given by
(A5), (A9), (A11), (A13), (A15), (A17), (A19), and (A21), and
to represent the complemen-
tarity conditions given by (A6), (A10), (A12), (A14), (A16),
(A18), (A20), and (A22).
B. Formulation of MPEC for Each Genco
The values of and in the genco’s (leader’s) problem
are produced by the ISO’s (follower’s) optimality conditions
(Appendix A). These variables can be expressed as the implicit
functions of all genco’s strategies
and should satisfy KKT conditions of the ISO’s optimization
problem (Appendix A).
The optimization problem of each genco can then be
described as the following MPEC (repeating (12)–(14) from
above):
Maximize (12)
Subject to
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
The incorporation of KKT conditions (15)–(17) reflects that
each genco anticipates the impact of dispatch by the ISO on
reactive power price and takes that into account in its decision
making.
C. Derivation of Genco’s Optimality Conditions
The Lagrangian of the genco’s problem (18) is represented in
terms of the first order conditions of the ISO’s problem given in
Appendix A. See equation (18) at the bottom of the next page.
The corresponding KKT conditions of each genco’s opti-
mization problem are derived as (19)–(30) at the bottom of the
next page, where
are the vectors consisting of Lagrange multi-
pliers of the KKT conditions of the ISO’s problem appended to
the genco’s problem. It is assumed that these variables are same
for each leader (genco), i.e., each genco prices the shared set of
constraints arising from the ISO in a similar manner.
D. Formulation of Equilibrium Between Gencos
The Nash equilibrium solution is computed by solving
(19)–(30) simultaneously for all the gencos. This leads to the
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formulation of an EPEC. Therefore, if is the optimal strategy
of genco at node , provided that the strategies of other gencos
are also optimal responses, then must satisfy the KKT con-
ditions of the optimization problems of all gencos. To put it in
a vector notation, the equilibrium must
satisfy the KKT conditions of the optimization problem of each
genco. That is, the equilibrium can be derived from the solution
of the problem formed by combining the KKT conditions of
all gencos’ optimization problems. This however leads to a
nonsquare nonlinear complementarity problem (NCP).
E. Solving EPEC as a Single NLP
A square NCP requires that all equation-variable pairs be
uniquely matched. In (18), we find that the complementarity
conditions of the ISO’s problem are associated with dual
variables . For example, the derivative of Lagrangian (18)
with respect to yields the minimum reactive power
constraint of ISO and also the complementarity constraint
. When (18) is differentiated with
respect to , we obtain . Here, both
and are matched with the same constraint. All such
instances make the NCP nonsquare, which makes these prob-
lems harder to solve as compared to the standard Nash games.
Leyffer and Munson [13] exploit this redundancy inherent in
the NCP formulation to derive nonlinear formulations of the
multi-leader-follower games, such as the one posed in this
paper. This approach has been used in [12]. This formulation
minimizes the complementarity conditions of the EPEC by
moving the complementarity conditions into the objective. The
remaining constraints are well behaved. The NLP formulation
of the EPEC is given as
Minimize
(31)
subject to (19), (20), (22), (24), (26), (27), and (29).
The constraints here do not include any complementarity con-
ditions that havebeen moved into the objective. It is shown in [13]
that the local solution to the above problem with is a
strongly stationary point of the multi-leader-follower game. As
suggested in [12] and [13], a practical way to solve such problems
is to test different initial points. The Nash equilibrium obtained
in the examples illustrated in the paper may not be unique. Also,
the solutions may form a connected set. As pointed out in [12], a
key feature of these equilibria is that they always occur in the field
limit of the D-curve of either generator. This may suggest a kind
ofcontinuumofequilibriaalong theD-curve.Tosomeextent, this
(18)
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may come from the trade-off between active and reactive gener-
ation that the D-curve introduces. However, this is just the reality
of the generation limits. In this paper, the D-curve is simplified
to box constraints (constant maximum and minimum levels for
reactive power); all these equilibria would not be captured. How-
ever, in certain cases, it is found that the equilibrium point shows
a kind of symmetry, in terms of reactive power, with respect to the
equilibrium where the reactive power levels of gencos are inter-
changed if the marginal costs of supplying reactive power from
these generators are the same.
IV. CASE STUDY AND DISCUSSIONS
The multi-leaders (gencos) and single follower (ISO) game
is simulated using the NLP formulation of the EPEC model de-
veloped in Sections III and IV. The simulations are carried out
using the Nordic 32-bus system. The value of the objective func-
tion (31), of all the optimization problems reported in this
paper are less than ; hence, it can be assumed to be suffi-
ciently close to zero. This is required by the theorem reported
in [13]. The computational challenges in solving such problems
are reported in [12] and [13], so we will not repeat them here.
The analysis is carried out to study the impact of strategic be-
havior of players on reactive power procurement by the ISO and
whether the ownership of a generator/synchronous condenser by
the ISO can help to mitigate market power. The following cases
are considered for analysis:
• Case-A: Competitive market; generators’ reactive power
price offers are at marginal costs and the market clears at a
uniform market price;
• Case-B: Oligopolistic reactive power market with strategic
offers from gencos (with );
• Case-C: Oligopolistic reactive power market with strategic
offers from gencos (with ) in the presence of
ISO-owned generator/synchronous condenser for reactive
power provision with a low, pre-declared, reactive power
price cap;
• Case-D: All conditions are same as Case-C, except that
.
Asymmetry of information on costs prevents the regulator
from using a cost plus regulation. As the regulator may not
know the cost information of each generator, a standard uni-
form price cap regulation might be construed as “too tight” by
gencos who do not find price caps lucrative enough to supply
reactive power, or it is “too loose” from the social benefit
viewpoint. A non-intrusive alternative price-cap mechanism is
considered in Cases C and D. The models have been devel-
oped in GAMS and solved using the CONOPT solver [17]. As
explained in [12], the leaders (gencos) problem is nonconvex,
and hence, standard NLP solvers can guarantee only a locally
optimal solution. The results obtained in the models of strategic
behavior (Cases B, C, and D) are simulated using alternative
starting values and also by fixing the values of the real and
reactive power outputs of the gencos in a narrow range around
the solution to the games. This helps in ascertaining whether
the profits of the leaders can be improved in a narrow range
around the solution to the game or with alternative starting
values. The results reported in this paper represent the points
for which the results cannot be improved in a reasonable neigh-
borhood ( around the reported results).
A. Nordic 32-Bus System
Let us now consider the 32-bus Nordic power system shown
in Fig. 1. There are 20 generators in the system, arbitrarily
grouped amongst four gencos. These four gencos along with
their associated buses denoting respective generator connec-
tions are given below:
• Genco-1: generators at buses 4071, 4072;
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)
(29)
(30)
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Fig. 1. Nordic 32-bus system.
• Genco-2: generators at buses 4011, 4012, 4021, 4031,
2032, 1012, 1013, 1014, 1021, and 1022;
• Genco-3: generators at buses 4042, 4041, 4051, 4057,
1043, and 1042;
• Genco-4: generators at buses 4062 and 4063.
All the generators can provide both active and reactive power,
but as mentioned earlier, it is assumed that the active power dis-
patch has already been carried out. The reactive power genera-
tion characteristics are given in Table I.
A computational challenge is the determination of the initial
points which lead the objective function of the NLP formulation
to near zero (less than ) of the proposed MPEC. The sim-
ulation results are provided in Tables II–IV.
B. Discussions
1) Strategic Behavior in the System: Comparing the total
payment for reactive power in Cases A and B (Table II), we find
that the total payment in case of the perfect competition with
uniform market price (Case A) is $3.644/h, while in the case
of strategic offers is $71.58/h (Case B). In Case B, we allow
the upper limit on strategic offer parameter to be a very
large number, . This is confirmed from column 3 of
Table III, where it is observed that most generators set their offer
strategy as high as possible, which is 25. Such a strategic
behavior is understandable and it increases the ISO’s payment
burden for reactive power significantly.
It is interesting to note that the reactive power output of the
generators increases at bus 1012 and 1014 in case B (Table IV).
TABLE I
GENERATOR DATA FOR GENERATORS IN THE NORDIC SYSTEM
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF UNIFORM PRICES AND TOTAL PAYMENT
TABLE III
COMPARISON OF THE STRATEGIC VARIABLES, REVENUES AND PROFITS
This is counter-intuitive to the notion that firms withhold output
in oligopolistic markets. The generators may increase their reac-
tive power output in case they observe that doing so allows them
to increase their profit maximizing levels without compromising
the network reliability. This is due to the local market power of
generators in reactive power market.
2) Alternative Price Cap Regulation: In Case C, which
presents the alternative regulation, the ISO sets up a generator
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TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF P AND Q IN FOUR CASES     
or synchronous condenser owned by itself at a strategic bus
and declares a low value of for that unit. The subscript
ISO denotes the ownership of the unit by the ISO. All strategic
generators take into consideration the low value of
in their respective optimization problems, re-strategize, and
change their offers to maximize their profits. The proposed
alternative regulatory approach is commonly termed as “Yard-
stick Regulation”, which has been applied in the electricity
markets of South America [18].
The idea of intervention by the ISO is to create conditions so
that the competing gencos offer to supply as close as possible
to their marginal costs. Hence, it is important to know where to
install the ISO owned unit. This is important because a subop-
timal selection of location and capacity by the ISO could have
adverse impacts on grid operation and the price. Application of
alternative price cap regulation proposed in this paper applied
to a large network is a challenging problem, not only because of
the associated numerical convergence issues but also because of
the complexities involved in the selection of the bus where the
ISO should locate its generator or condenser.
In this paper, the results reported in [8] are used, where
must-run indices are used to identify the bus with maximum
must-run capacity in reactive power. In the system under con-
sideration, the generator at bus 4072 has considerable market
power. This was also reported in earlier research [6], [7].
Now, if the ISO owns a synchronous condenser of 100 MVAr
capacity at bus-4072 and considering , it is
seen that the uniform market price decreases to $8/p.u.MVAr
against $33.27/p.u.MVAr (Case B) (Table II). This is because
other generators must choose and the corresponding
to maximize their profits subject to satisfying the constraint
. Therefore, they find that there is
a trade-off between increasing and . The presence of
ISO-owned synchronous condenser, which unilaterally declares
a lower cap on strategic variable, therefore forces the competing
gencos in Case C to lower their strategic variable as shown in
column 4 of Table III.
As stated earlier in this section, the intervention by the ISO
seeks to mimic the conditions of competition. In Case C, the
ISO might view that uniform market price equal to $8/p.u.
MVAr is still high as compared to a competitive market (Case
A). In such conditions, the ISO, along with the presence of ISO-
owned synchronous condenser with a pre-declared
, might place an arbitrary cap (depending on the minimum
level that will induce the gencos to supply reactive power) on
the bids. In this paper in Case D, we assume that the ISO has a
rough estimate of the cost based on the generation technology
of generator (type of generators) at each node and hence sets
a cap equal to five times the estimated marginal cost at each
node, i.e., . In Case D, we observe from Table II
that this combination of price cap and alternative price cap
mechanism, proposed in this paper, leads to a uniform market
price of 1.85$/p.u. MVAr, which is then reasonably close to
the uniform market price in Case A.
It should be noted that in Case C, the values of
of the generators are still much higher than unity, and the
market price and payments are still much higher than Case
A. This problem is because of the local nature of reactive
power supply. Exercise of market power cannot be completely
avoided. Reactive power generated by ISO-owned synchronous
condenser cannot be transmitted over long distances as a
“strategic supply” for reactive power demand at distant buses.
Nevertheless, this problem can be minimized by selecting mul-
tiple nodes for location of ISO owned synchronous condensers
in large power systems or by using a combination or price cap
regulation and alternative price cap regulation as demonstrated
in Case D.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, the strategic behavior of generators and syn-
chronous condensers in the reactive power market is exam-
ined using the supply function equilibrium framework based
on nonlinear ac load flow. Because of the local nature of re-
active power supply, it is observed that the equilibrium be-
tween the suppliers of reactive power settles very close to the
price-cap in most cases. Also, if a genco has reactive power
supply sources at multiple locations, it can strategically act to
sometimes supply more reactive power. Changing the price-cap
in either direction could be construed as either allowing the
suppliers too much or not giving them adequate incentives to
participate in the market. An alternative price-cap regulatory
mechanism is proposed and tested, where the participation by
the ISO owned supply of reactive power with pre-declared
lower price-cap helps mitigate some of the shortcomings of
gaming by private generators.
APPENDIX
The KKT conditions of the SO’s problem are in (A1)–(A22)
on the following two pages.
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(A1)
(A2)
(A3)
(A4)
(A5)
(A6)
(A7)
(A8)
(A9)
(A10)
(A11)
(A12)
(A13)
(A14)
(A15)
(A16)
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(A17)
(A18)
(A19)
(A20)
(A21)
(A22)
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